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Abstract In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich
have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, argu-
ments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish
a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in
semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theo-
rising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is
unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do
little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to
justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified
by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence
to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race)
and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires).
1 Introduction
In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have
developed a powerful critique of what they call arguments from reference—
arguments that assume a theory of reference in order to establish a substantive
conclusion (Machery et al. 2004, 2013; Mallon et al. 2009). This style of argument
is often used in debates about whether, for some F, there are Fs. For example, one
might argue that there are no beliefs, races, moral properties, colours, etc., because
(say) nothing satisfies the descriptions that common-sense associates with the
& Mark Pinder
mark.jonathan.pinder@gmail.com
1 University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
123
Erkenn
DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9868-9
corresponding terms—thereby assuming a descriptivist theory of reference—;1 or
one might argue that there are beliefs, races, moral properties, colours, etc., because
(say) there is a common essence amongst the things we typically use those terms to
denote—thereby assuming a causal-historical theory of reference.2 Machery et al.
critique such arguments by attacking the assumption that a particular theory of
reference is correct: they argue that the standard methodology for theorising about
reference is flawed, and thus that the assumption of any theory of reference in an
argument from reference is unjustified. They conclude that every argument from
reference has an unjustified assumption.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, I argue that the many extant responses
to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as
the responses do not show how to justify her assumption of a theory of reference. If
philosophers are to continue using arguments from reference, an acceptable strategy
for justifying the assumption of a theory of reference must be provided.
Second, I show how the assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from
reference can in principle be justified by an appeal to explication.3 In particular, the
assumption of a theory of reference for the relevant common-sense terms can be justified
by an explication of the common-sense concepts expressed by those terms. I call this
response the explication defence of arguments from reference. By way of illustration, I
apply the explication defence to two of Machery et al.’s principal examples of arguments
from reference: Andreasen’s (2000) argument for the biological reality of race; and
Churchland’s (1981) argument against the existence of beliefs, desires and other familiar
mental states. (Towards the end of the paper, I also briefly suggest that the defence can be
applied to Boyd’s (1988) defence of moral knowledge as a posteriori.) In appropriate
contexts, then, arguments from reference may be sound.
2 Background
A theory of reference seeks to provide a systematic basis upon which worldly items
are assigned to some collection of words or concepts. Broadly speaking, there are
two principal types of theory of reference: descriptivist theories and causal-
historical theories. Descriptivist theories of reference hold that competent speakers
associate reference-fixing descriptions with the relevant terms or concepts, and that
the referent of a given term or concept is whatever satisfies, or comes sufficiently
close to satisfying, the relevant reference-fixing descriptions.4 Thus, on a
1 E.g., respectively: Churchland (1981), Appiah (1985), Mackie (1977) (viz. the argument from
queerness), Maund (2011).
2 E.g., respectively: Lycan (1988), Andreasen (2000), Boyd (1988), and (perhaps) Bradley and Tye
(2001).
3 Schupbach (2015) and Shepherd and Justus (2015) argue that experimentation can play a positive role
in explication. The general idea in the present paper is quite different, and is not in tension with these
authors’ work.
4 I stay neutral throughout on the distinction between strong descriptivism, on which the reference-fixing
description also constitutes the meaning of the term, and weak descriptivism, on which the reference-
fixing description merely provide a referent for the term.
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descriptivist theory for ‘‘Go¨del’’, if Padma associates the description proved the
incompleteness theorem with ‘‘Go¨del’’, and if Go¨del proved the incompleteness
theorem, then (in Padma’s language) ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers to Go¨del. In contrast, causal-
historical theories of reference hold that a term or concept t refers to an entity x just
in case there is an appropriate causal-historical chain of users acquiring t from other
users, such that the chain began with an initial ‘baptism’ of x. Thus, on a causal-
historical theory for ‘‘Go¨del’’, if Padma’s use of ‘‘Go¨del’’ can be traced back via an
appropriate causal-historical chain (of other users of ‘‘Go¨del’’) to a ‘baptism’ of
Go¨del, then (in Padma’s language) ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers to Go¨del.
Machery et al. characterise arguments from reference as ‘‘arguments that derive
philosophically significant conclusions from the assumption of one or another
theory of reference’’ (Mallon et al. 2009: 332). Herein, I principally focus on two of
their principal examples.5
The first is an argument drawn from Andreasen 2000 in favour of the biological
reality of race. Andreasen begins by offering a ‘cladistic definition of race’ in terms
of a phylogenetic classification of human breeding populations, where ‘‘[a] ‘breeding
population’ is a set of local populations that exchange genetic material through
reproduction and are reasonably reproductively isolated from other such sets’’ (p.
S659). The idea is that, when various subpopulations of a ‘parent’ breeding
population separate from each other—perhaps for geographical or socio-cultural
reasons—‘daughter’ breeding populations are generated. Andreasen then cites
research (Cavalli-Sforza 1991) that plausibly supports the conclusion that such
cladistic populations are in fact biologically real. Starting from the ‘‘undifferentiated
stock of modern humans evolving in Africa *200,000 years ago’’ (2000: S660),
[t]he first split divides Africans from all other populations. The second split
represents a division between Pacific-Southeast Asians and the rest of the
world. After that division, the Australopapuans diverged from the rest of
Pacific-Southeast Asia, and the fourth split separates northeast Asians and
Amerindians from European and non-European Caucasoids. (ibid.)
Andreasen takes this to support the conclusion that race is biologically real.
Andreasen is explicit that her cladistic definition of race deviates from common-
sense conceptions of race (pp. S661–S662); she tentatively suggests that, according
to common-sense, ‘‘races are demarcated by appeal to observable properties (e.g.,
skin color, hair type, and eye shape) [that may be taken to be] good predictors of
more significant inherited differences (e.g., behavioural, intellectual, or physiolog-
ical differences)’’ (p. S663). To justify this deviation, Andreasen points to causal-
historical theories of reference:
The objectivity of a kind, biological or otherwise, is not called into question by
the fact that ordinary people have mistaken beliefs about the nature of that
kind. Those familiar with the causal theory of reference for natural kind terms
will be aware of this possibility. (p. S662)
5 See Mallon et al. (2009: 333–337).
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According to Machery et al., Andreasen here assumes a causal-historical theory of
reference for ‘‘race’’.6
An anonymous reviewer makes the helpful point that there are essentially two
components to Andreasen’s argument: a metaphysical/scientific sub-argument that
the relevant cladistic populations are biologically real; and a semantic sub-argument
drawing upon theories of reference to establish that ‘‘race’’ can be used to denote
such populations. Importantly, both components are required to establish
Andreasen’s conclusion that race is biologically real.7 Andreasen does not merely
seek to establish that cladistic populations are biologically real, subsequently
choosing to express this conclusion using ‘‘race’’: the conclusion is rather that those
biologically real populations are races—that races, not merely cladistic populations,
are a part of biological reality. In this sense, Andreasen’s conclusion is a substantive
conclusion concerning human biology and race.
Thus, according to Machery et al., Andreasen assumes a causal-historical theory
of reference in order to establish the substantive conclusion that race is biologically
real.
The second example is an argument by Churchland (1981) in support of his
eliminative materialism. Churchland begins by arguing that the common-sense
mental-state concepts of belief, desire, etc., are theoretical concepts of folk
psychology. Here, folk psychology is construed as a theory consisting of a set of
laws. Amongst these laws are those that either: (1) connect external circumstances
to mental states; (2) connect mental states to other mental states; or (3) connect
mental states to actions. For example, respectively:
(1) For all x, y: if y is in x’s field of vision, then (ceteris paribus) x is aware of y.
(2) (i) For all x, p: if x fears p, then (ceteris paribus) x desires not-p.
(ii) For all x, p, q: if x believes p and x believes [p implies q], then (ceteris
paribus) x believes q.
(3) For all x, p, u: if both x desires p, and x believes that uing will bring about
that p, then (ceteris paribus) x will u.8
The theoretical concepts of folk psychology (with which Churchland identifies the
common-sense mental-state concepts) are just the concepts expressed by the non-
logical vocabulary in such laws. Churchland goes on to argue that contemporary
science shows that it is a serious possibility that folk psychology is radically false.
He thus concludes that it is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs, desires, etc.
This argument assumes that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology have
their extensions fixed descriptively, with the laws of folk psychology acting as
reference-fixing descriptions. It is only with this assumption that the radical falsity
6 See Mallon et al. (2009: 337). Pace Mallon et al., Andreasen does not commit herself to the assumption
of a causal-historical theory of reference. Rather, she claims that her ‘‘point does not depend on the
specifics of the causal theory’’, and gives a few examples ‘‘to support the idea that the objectivity of a
kind is not undermined by the fact that ordinary people have mistaken beliefs about its nature’’ (2000:
S662). The discussion in Sect. 4 provides one way of filling in the details of Andreasen’s line of thought.
7 Note that this conclusion is essential to Andreasen’s aims: she ultimately seeks to establish that
biological realism and social constructivism are compatible views about race (2000: S653–S655).
8 For more examples, see Churchland (1979: ch. 4).
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of folk psychology would suffice to establish that there are no beliefs, desires, etc. In
contrast, given (say) a causal-historical theory of reference for those concepts,
Churchland’s argument is invalid: the theoretical concepts of folk psychology might
stand at the end of appropriate causal-historical chains, at the other end of which are
successful baptisms, even if the laws of folk psychology are radically false of
whatever was baptised. In that case, even if common-sense mental-state concepts
are theoretical concepts of folk psychology, the radical falsity of the laws of folk
psychology would not suffice to establish that there are no beliefs, desires, etc.
It is worth emphasising that, like Andreasen, Churchland seeks a substantive
conclusion. In particular, Churchland seeks to draw a substantive conclusion about
human psychology and mental architecture: whatever psychological states there are
in humans, belief, desire, etc., are not among them—beliefs, desires, etc., are not a
part of human psychological reality. Such claims are not in any sense metalinguis-
tic, nor are they about our intuitions concerning human psychology or mental
architecture. Churchland’s arguments assumes a theory of reference in support of a
substantive claim concerning human psychology and mental architecture.
Machery et al.’s critique of arguments from reference is designed to undermine
the assumption of a theory of reference. We can understand the critique as
consisting of four claims.
Claim One: experimental evidence suggests that there is cross-cultural variation
in semantic intuitions—and, in particular, intuitions about reference. Machery et al.
summarise the evidence as follows.
In two separate studies […], we found that Americans were more likely than
Chinese to give causal-historical responses. […] As we had predicted, Chinese
participants tended to have descriptivist intuitions, while Americans tended to
have [causal-historical] intuitions. (Mallon et al. 2009: 341)
Claim Two: cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions would undermine the
use of semantic intuitions in theorising about reference. The issue is that
philosophers usually appeal only to their own intuitions about reference and
those of a few colleagues, perhaps because they take these intuitions to be
representative of competent speakers’ intuitions or perhaps because they take
them to be more reliable. (Machery et al. 2013: 620)
However, according to Machery et al.,
the evidence suggests that it is wrong for philosophers to assume a priori the
universality of their own semantic intuitions. […] We find it wildly
implausible that the semantic intuitions of the narrow cross-section of
humanity who are Western academic philosophers are a more reliable
indicator of the correct theory of reference (if there is such a thing […]) than
the differing semantic intuitions of other cultural or linguistic groups
(Machery et al. 2004: B8–B9)
Claim Three: semantic intuitions would be required to determine which theory of
reference (if any) is correct. The idea is that,
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[o]nce we see that lots of assumptions are needed to turn [a] ‘‘picture’’ into a
full-fledged theory [of reference], we realize, first, that there are lots of nearby
theories of reference, and, second, that jiggling one or another fine point […]
yields an alternative theory from which different philosophically significant
conclusions follow. […] It seems that in practice the way to know which one
of these options is the right one is to rely on intuitions [about reference] […].
(Machery et al. 2013: 624)
Claim Four: the assumption of a theory of reference (in any argument from
reference) is unjustified if we are not in a position to determine whether or not it is
correct. So without an acceptable methodology for theorising about reference, the
assumption of any particular theory of reference is unjustified.
Machery et al. conclude that, given the available experimental evidence, every
argument from reference has an unjustified assumption: as they stand, all arguments
from reference fail.
Let me make two immediate comments about the critique. First, the particular
intuitions tested by Machery et al. concern proper names, whereas the arguments
from reference they cite make use of terms—such as ‘‘race’’ and ‘‘belief’’—that are
not proper names.9 However, Machery et al. take it that cross-cultural variation in
folk semantic intuitions about proper names may indicate cross-cultural variation in
folk semantic intuitions more generally. In what follows, I accept this for the sake of
argument. (My discussion of the literature in Sect. 3 would apply mutatis mutandis
had the literature not focused on proper names.)
Second, Machery et al.’s critique draws upon alleged variation in folk semantic
intuitions to undermine arguments from reference. This may seem strange, as
variation in such intuitions appears to be independent of such substantive biological
and psychological issues as whether race is biologically real and whether there are
beliefs and desires.10 Nonetheless, this apparent independence does not serve to
undermine the critique. Machery et al. are certainly right to think that the
assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from reference requires some
kind of justification. And this is so whether or not the conclusions of such arguments
are independent of the alleged cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions. To
respond to the critique, the proponent of an argument from reference must provide a
justification for her assumption of a theory of reference—and if that justification
makes use of semantic intuitions, then she must explain, in light of the experimental
data, why the justification stands.
9 Perhaps ‘‘race’’ and ‘‘belief’’ are more like kind terms. Experimental work on kind terms, though, has
not addressed the question of cross-cultural variation. See e.g., Braisby et al. (1996), Jylkka¨ et al. (2009),
Genone and Lombrozo (2012), Nichols et al. (2016).
10 To be clear, Machery et al. would probably agree with this point. E.g., Mallon (2006: 547ff) argues
that disputes about the correct theory of reference for ‘‘race’’ do not help us resolve important
metaphysical questions in the philosophy of race.
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3 Extant Responses
The critique has given rise to a great deal of discussion. Typically, this discussion
has not explicitly focused on whether Machery et al. have successfully undermined
arguments from reference, but has rather focused on Claims One, Two and Three of
the critique.11,12 In this section, I consider whether this discussion provides the
proponent of an argument from reference with an adequate response to Machery
et al.’s critique. I argue not.
3.1 Responses to Claim One
A number of theorists argue that Machery et al.’s experimental data fail to show that
there is cross-cultural variation in folk semantic intuitions.
In Machery et al. (2004), English-speaking participants from Hong Kong and the
US were presented with vignettes based on so-called ‘Go¨del’ and ‘Jonah’ cases
made famous by Kripke (1980). For example, in the vignette based on the Go¨del-
case: John has learnt that Go¨del proved the incompleteness theorems, but has heard
nothing else of Go¨del; and, unbeknownst to John, Schmidt in fact did the work in
question but died in mysterious circumstances, after which Go¨del got hold of the
manuscript and took credit for the work. After each vignette, participants were
asked a question, designed to elicit either a descriptivist intuition or a causal-
historical intuition; for the Go¨del-case:
When John uses the name ‘‘Go¨del’’, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work?
Machery et al. found that, in response to Go¨del-cases, Chinese participants were
more likely to answer (A) whereas Western participants were more likely to answer
(B). The authors gloss these results by stating that ‘‘Chinese participants tended to
have descriptivist intuitions, while Westerners tended to have Kripkean [causal-
historical] ones’’ (p. B7). And they take this result to support the claim that
Westerners are ‘‘more likely than the Chinese to have intuitions that fall in line with
causal-historical accounts of reference’’ (p. B8)—i.e. that there is cross-cultural
variation in folk semantic intuitions.
A number of objections have been raised.13 For example, Martı´ (2009) claims
that Machery et al.’s experiment tests metalinguistic intuitions about theories of
reference, rather than semantic intuitions; and thus that the experiment fails to
establish that there is cross-cultural variation in folk semantic intuitions. In contrast,
Deutsch (2009: 453ff) claims that the experiment fails to distinguish between
intuitions about the speaker reference of ‘‘Go¨del’’ (i.e. the object to which John
11 One exception is Ichikawa et al. (2012: 67–68). Their brief comments rely on their response to claim
three of Machery et al.’s critique, which I discuss in Sect. 3.3 below.
12 Cf. Hansen (2015).
13 In addition to those discussed below, Lam (2010) criticises the lack of Cantonese vignettes; see
Machery et al. (2010) for a response.
The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
123
intended to refer) and intuitions about the semantic reference of ‘‘Go¨del’’ (i.e. the
object assigned to it by linguistic convention); and thus that the experiment fails to
establish that there is cross-cultural variation in folk intuitions concerning semantic
reference. Sytsma and Livengood (2011) claim that Machery et al.’s vignettes
contain an ambiguity in epistemic perspective; the experiments fail to distinguish
between whether the participants are answering the question from John’s epistemic
perspective or from the narrator’s epistemic perspective. Systma and Livengood
suggest that participants might conceivably answer (A) if they are limiting
themselves to the information available to John, even if those participants would
answer (B) given the information available to the narrator. Sytsma and Livengood
conclude that, as Machery et al.’s data could be explained by cross-cultural
variation in how epistemic perspective is disambiguated, the experiment fails to
establish that there is cross-cultural variation in folk semantic intuitions.
In light of such objections to Machery et al.’s experimental work, the proponent
of an argument from reference might reason as follows: the experimental evidence
does not support the conclusion that there is cross-cultural variation in folk
semantic intuitions, so Claim One is false, so Machery et al. have failed to show that
the assumption of a theory of reference in arguments from reference is unjustified.
There are at least three problems with this line of reasoning, however. First,
further experimental work suggests that Machery et al.’s findings are in fact
reasonably robust. Revised versions of the initial experiment designed to take into
account the objections of Martı´, Deutsch and Sytsma and Livengood appear to
successfully replicate the initial results. See, respectively, Machery et al.
(2009, 2015), and Sytsma et al. (2015). The increasing stock of data is by-and-
large consistent with the hypothesis that there is cross-cultural variation in semantic
intuitions.
Second, even if it were shown that there is no cross-cultural variation in folk
semantic intuitions, this would not suffice as a response to Machery et al.’s critique.
As Machery et al. make clear (e.g., 2013: 632–633), it is not enough that one’s
assumption of a theory of reference has not been shown to be unjustified; the
proponent of an argument from reference still owes us an account of how to collate
the relevant intuitions to yield ‘‘a full-fledged theory of reference (causal-historical
or otherwise) that can serve to underwrite arguments from reference’’ (Machery
et al. 2013: 633). And this is not straightforward: ‘‘resourceful descriptivists can
accommodate the intuitions about actual cases that form the basis of [Kripke’s
arguments] (just as resourceful non-descriptivists can accommodate the intuitions
about ‘Madagascar’ and ‘King Arthur’ […])’’ (p. 625). It would remain incumbent
upon the proponent of an argument from reference to provide a justification for the
particular theory of reference that underpins her argument from reference.
Third, regardless, if the viability of an appeal to semantic intuitions depends on
whether or not there is cross-cultural variation in folk semantic intuitions, then those
intuitions are ill-suited for justifying the assumption of a theory of reference in
arguments from reference. Recall that arguments from reference seek to establish
substantive conclusions about, for example, whether race is biologically real and
whether there are beliefs and desires. Yet, as suggested above, variation in folk
semantic intuitions is not relevant to such substantive biological and psychological
M. Pinder
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issues: there is no reason to think that the biological reality of race, or facts about
our mental architecture, are so straightforwardly sensitive to the distribution of folk
semantic intuitions. If Andreasen’s and Churchland’s arguments from reference are
at all plausible, then the arguments should not depend on whether there is cross-
cultural variation in semantic intuitions. That is, the proponent of an argument from
reference would like a justification for her assumption of a theory of reference such
that the justification is independent of the distribution of folk semantic intuitions.
Preferably, the justification for the assumption of a theory of reference in an
argument from reference should rely on factors that are plausibly relevant to the
substantive conclusion of the argument from reference. The proponent of an
argument from reference, then, should not rely on the possibility that there is no
cross-cultural variation in folk semantic intuitions.
3.2 Responses to Claim Two
Some theorists argue that, even if there is cross-cultural variation in folk semantic
intuitions, this does not suffice to undermine the use of semantic intuitions for
theorising about reference. According to the expertise defence, the intuitions of
experts-about-reference carry more weight than folk intuitions, and are not
undermined by Machery et al.’s experimental data. I focus here upon Devitt’s
variant of the defence.14
According to Devitt, semantic intuitions are theory-laden in an important sense.
[T]he intuitions are mostly the product of experiences of the linguistic world.
They are like ‘‘observation’’ judgments. As such, they are ‘‘theory-laden’’ in
just the way that we commonly think observation judgments are. (Devitt
2012a: 19)
In particular, for Devitt,
Linguistic education should make a person a better indicator of linguistic
reality just as biological education makes a person a better indicator of
biological reality. (2006: 115)
Thus, for example, intuitions about reference in a given case—such as a Go¨del-
case—may be affected by one’s belief in a given theory of reference. Devitt
concludes that
we should prefer the linguistic intuitions of linguists and philosophers because
they have the better background theory and training. (2012a: 19)
If this is right, then the philosophical import of Machery et al.’s experimental data is
greatly diminished; the variation in folk semantic intuitions in Go¨del-cases may
simply be insignificant next to the intuition, widespread amongst experts-about-
reference, that ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers to the publisher of the manuscript.
14 See Devitt (2011, 2012a, b), and Machery et al. (2013), Machery (2012a, b) for responses. For other
variants, see e.g., Cohnitz and Haukioja (2015), Ludwig (2007).
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Inspired by the expertise defence, the proponent of an argument from reference
may reason as follows: the intuitions of experts-about-reference carry more weight
than folk intuitions, so Machery et al.’s empirical work fails to undermine the use of
semantic intuitions in theorising about reference, so Claim Two can be rejected, so
Machery et al. have failed to show that the assumption of a theory of reference in
arguments from reference is unjustified.
In parallel to the discussion in the previous subsection, there are three problems
with this line of reasoning. First, Machery presents experimental data that
threatens the expertise defence (2012a: 45–52). Roughly, the data suggest that, if
expertise about reference has an effect upon intuitions, then the effect is
inconsistent across different disciplines: semanticists and philosophers of language
tended to have more causal-historical intuitions than similarly educated lay
people, whereas discourse analysts, sociolinguists and historical linguists tended to
have more descriptivist intuitions than similarly educated lay people.15 While this
study is tentative and more work is required—for example, in Machery’s study,
the latter tendency did not reach statistical significance—we should be cautious
about the claim that expertise about reference increases the reliability of intuitions
about reference.
Second, even if the semantic intuitions of experts-about-reference do carry
more weight than folk semantic intuitions, this does not per se provide a
justification for the assumption of a theory of reference in arguments from
reference. As before, the proponent of an argument from reference would have to
show how those intuitions support whichever theory of reference underwrites her
argument from reference.
Third, it is not clear that a plausible argument from reference should depend in
this way on the semantic intuitions of experts-about-reference. Arguments from
reference seek to establish substantive conclusions about, for example, biology
and psychology. And the questions of whether race is biologically real, or of
whether there are beliefs, desires, etc., are not obviously sensitive to the semantic
intuitions of experts-about-reference. With respect to substantive biological and
psychological questions, it is not particularly plausible that the semantic intuitions
of Devitt and Kripke should carry so much more weight than, say, those of
biologists and psychologists. In general, the proponent of an argument from
reference would like to provide a justification for her assumption of a theory of
reference such that the justification does not rely pivotally on the semantic
intuitions of experts-about-reference. Preferably, the justification for the assump-
tion of a theory of reference in an argument from reference should rely on factors
that are plausibly relevant to the substantive conclusion of the argument from
reference. The proponent of an argument from reference, then, should not rely on
the expertise defence.
15 Should the latter group of theorists count as experts about reference? Machery (2012a: 51–52) claims
so, but provides minimal argument; Devitt (2012a: 24) doubts Machery’s conclusion without (as far as I
can tell) addressing Machery’s argument. In at least this respect, more work is required before we can
confidently interpret Machery’s findings. Regardless, we cannot simply assume that discourse analysts,
sociolinguists and historical linguists are inexpert about reference.
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3.3 Responses to Claim Three
A number of theorists have argued that Machery et al. overestimate the importance
of semantic intuitions and, in particular, intuitions about Go¨del-cases.16 For
example, Ichikawa et al. (2012) and Devitt (2011) downplay the importance of
semantic intuitions. Ichikawa et al. emphasise
Kripke’s first argument […] that for most names, most users of the name
cannot give an individuating description of the bearer of the name. […] The
best they can do for ‘Cicero’ is ‘a famous Roman orator’ and the best they can
do for ‘Feynman’ is ‘a famous physicist’. (2012: 61)
See Kripke (1980: 81–82). As Ichikawa et al. understand Kripke, this argument
establishes that some names do not have their referents fixed descriptively; the
Go¨del-case is merely intended ‘‘to show that the number of descriptive names in
English is not just small, it is very small’’ (p. 63). Devitt (2011: 421–424), on the
other hand, emphasises the importance of modal intuitions—such as that Feynman
could have not been a physicist—which appear to be incompatible with (strong)
descriptivist theories of reference.
In contrast, Deutsch (2009: 450f) seeks to downplay the importance of intuitions
in general; he claims that it is not the intuition that ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers to Go¨del that is
intended to undermine the descriptivist theory of reference, but that ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers
to Go¨del. And Deutsch suggests (pp. 451–452) that Kripke has independent
arguments for that the claim that ‘‘Go¨del’’ refers to Go¨del. Here is Deutsch’s first
example.
All that many of us ‘know’ about Peano is that he was the discoverer of certain
axioms concerning the natural numbers. But it turns out that Dedekind
discovered those axioms. If descriptivism is true, many of us have been
referring all along to Dedekind with our uses of ‘Peano’. But we have not been
referring to Dedekind with those uses. We have been referring instead to
Peano, misattributing to him the discovery of the axioms. This […] strengthens
the claim that the Go¨del-case is a counterexample [to descriptivism] by
showing us that the way in which we ought to judge, with respect to the
imaginary Go¨del-case, should line up with the way in which we do in fact, and
correctly, judge about the real-life Peano case. (pp. 451–452)
Such arguments, according to Deutsch, do not appeal to intuitions.
Inspired by such responses, the proponent of an argument from reference may
reason as follows: semantic intuitions are not necessary for determining which
theory of reference (if any) is correct, so Claim Three is false, so Machery et al.
have failed to show that the assumption of a theory of reference in arguments from
reference is unjustified.
Two of the problems discussed above apply to this line of reasoning. First, it does
not suffice as a response to Machery et al. to downplay the importance of semantic
intuitions in theorising about reference. As noted above, it would remain incumbent
16 In addition to the discussion below, see Devitt (2011: 420–424).
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upon the proponent of an argument from reference to provide a justification for her
particular assumption of a theory of reference.
Second, such substantive issues as the biological reality of race and human
mental architecture are independent of the data discussed by Ichikawa et al., Devitt
and Deutsch; they are independent of whether most users of ‘‘Feynman’’ have an
individuating description of Feynman, whether Feynman could have not been a
physicist, and whether Peano axiomatised the natural numbers. If Andreasen’s and
Churchland’s arguments from reference are plausible at all, the justification for their
assumptions of theories of reference should be independent of the kinds of data
discussed by Ichikawa et al., Devitt and Deutsch. Ultimately, I suggest, the
proponent of an argument from reference should seek an altogether different kind of
justification for her assumption of a theory of reference.
4 The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
The assumption of a theory of reference in an argument from reference can, in
principle, be justified by explication. Although this explication defence may not
work in all cases, it is effective for at least two of Machery et al.’s principal targets:
Andreasen’s and Churchland’s arguments from reference.
4.1 Explication
Explication is to be understood, in a broadly Carnapian sense, as a stipulated
refinement of a common-sense or otherwise imprecise concept, in order to facilitate
subsequent theorising.17 The common-sense or imprecise concept with which we
begin is the explicandum, and the refined concept is the explicatum.
Explications are stipulative: an explicatum is neither intended to describe the
explicandum nor encode its ordinary usage. Rather, the explicatum is offered as a
theoretical replacement of the explicandum. When theorising, so goes the thought,
one ought to use the explicatum in place of the explicandum.
There may be good explications and bad explications. Whether an explication is
good will depend on various criteria. Carnap provides four criteria, which an
explication should satisfy to ‘‘a sufficient degree’’ (1950: 7).
(I) The explicatum should be similar in relevant respects to the explicandum.
(II) The explicatum should be precise.
(III) The explicatum should be a fruitful concept.
(IV) The explicatum should be simple.
With respect to (I), Carnap notes that ‘‘close similarity is not required, and
considerable differences are permitted’’ (ibid.). The extension of the explicandum
need not be preserved, so long as some key features are preserved. With respect to
(II), explicit rules for using the explicatum should be given; these rules can, but
need not, be given in the form of a definition. With respect to (III), Carnap
17 See Carnap (1950).
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understands a concept to be fruitful insofar as it is ‘‘useful for the formulation of
many universal statements’’ (ibid.), where these statements should presumably
underpin relevant explanations and predictions. And, finally, (IV) is taken to be
subordinate to (I)–(III); as such, I largely leave it to one side in what follows.
Let me provide an immediate example. Consider the concept of planet.18 Until
recently, there was no agreed upon definition—merely nine canonical instances.
Then, in 2006, the International Astronomical Union explicated the concept,
refining it so as to provide a better taxonomy of celestial objects. A planet was
henceforth to be an object such that: (a) it orbited a star but did not orbit another
planet; (b) it was large enough for gravity to have formed it into a sphere but not
large enough for its gravity to trigger fusion; and (c) it had cleared its orbit of debris.
Here, the explicandum is the pre-2006 concept, with its nine canonical instances;
and the explicatum is the refined concept with its tripartite satisfaction condition.
The explication of the concept of planet plausibly satisfies Carnap’s criteria.
Criterion (I) is satisfied: eight of the nine canonical instances of the explicandum—
all except Pluto, which fails to satisfy (c)—fall under the explicatum; and objects
that would previously have been deemed canonical non-planets—such as the moon,
the sun, shards of ice in the Kuiper Belt, etc.—do not fall under the explicatum.
Criterion (II) is satisfied: the explicatum is introduced with a tripartite definition
(a)–(c). Criterion (III) will plausibly be shown to be satisfied in due course: insofar
as the explicatum provides a unified cosmological kind, it is likely that the
explicatum will prove to be fruitful—or, at least, more fruitful than the
explicandum. And, insofar as the tripartite definition (a)–(c) is simple, the
explication satisfies criterion (IV). By Carnap’s lights, then, the IAU’s explication
of the concept of planet was plausibly a good explication.
There are two features of this account of explication that will play an important
role in what follows. The first feature:
Referential Control. The theorist can stipulate how the extension of an
explicatum is fixed. That is, the theorist can stipulate which theory of
reference applies to an explicatum.
Referential Control follows jointly from the fact that explications are stipulative,
and the fact that the extensions of explicanda need not be preserved. By way of
example, consider again the IAU’s explication of planet. It is natural to understand
the IAU as implicitly stipulating that a descriptivist theory of reference applies to
the explicatum: its extension contains whatever comes sufficiently close to
satisfying (a)–(c).
The second feature is this:
Explicandum Replacement. When theorising about a subject matter, one ought
to use appropriate explicata in place of the corresponding explicanda.
18 I roughly follow Ludlow’s (2014: 41ff) discussion here, although Ludlow is concerned with meaning
modulation rather than explication.
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Here, I take appropriate explicata to be those that (i) are relevant to the subject
matter and (ii) are the result of good explications.19 How do we use an explicatum in
place of an explicandum? Suppose that an ordinary term t ordinarily expresses a
common-sense concept c, and that a good explication of c yields the explicatum cE.
Then, we use cE in place of c by taking t to express cE.
By way of example, consider again the IAU’s explication of planet. Suppose that,
as I suggested above, the explication was a good explication. Then, according to
Explicandum Replacement, a cosmologist (qua cosmologist) should now take
‘‘planet’’ to express the explicatum in place of the explicandum. That is, when
theorising, the cosmologist should ceteris paribus be willing to assert ‘‘Pluto is not a
planet’’, and to deny ‘‘Pluto is a planet’’.
Before proceeding, I note that a variety of philosophical objections have been
raised against Carnap’s account of explication. Carnap and others have responded to
these objections.20 I will not re-address such objections, but will assume that
explication is a legitimate method for concept refinement. On that assumption, I
argue that the proponent of an argument from reference can justify her assumption
of a theory of reference. For those who do not endorse explication, the following
discussion nonetheless provides an example of the kind of justification that the
proponent of an argument from reference must provide for her assumption of a
theory of reference: given something like Referential Control and Explicandum
Replacement, she can adequately respond to Machery et al.’s critique.
4.2 Andreasen’s Argument
Explication can be used to justify the assumption of a theory of reference in
arguments from reference. We begin with Andreasen’s argument, introduced in
Sect. 2, which points to causal-historical theories of reference in justifying deviation
from common-sense conceptions of race. According to Machery et al., the argument
thus assumes a causal-historical theory of reference for ‘‘race’’ in order to establish
the substantive conclusion that race is real.
Now, pace Machery et al., I do not think that Andreasen’s argument assumes a
causal-historical theory of reference. Rather, as I construe the argument, it in fact
assumes a descriptivist theory of reference. So let me explain how we can
understand the argument in terms of an explication and, afterwards, I will explain
why Machery et al. characterise Andreasen to be assuming a causal-historical theory
of reference.
Andreasen’s argument is naturally construed as built upon an explication. The
explicandum is the common-sense concept of race. The explicatum is introduced as
19 This issue is complicated if we acknowledge that, for a given explicandum, there may be competing
explicata. In particular, multiple explicata may be (i) relevant to the subject matter and (ii) the result of
good explications. There is latitude about what we say about such a situation; perhaps the theorist is
permitted to use either explicata or perhaps she is required to use the best explicatum. (The former option
would complicate the explication defence, but is compatible with the general strategy.) For simplicity, I
leave this issue to one side throughout.
20 See e.g., Carnap (1963), Justus (2012), Kitcher (2008), Maher (2007).
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follows. (The details of the proposal are not important for present purposes; see
Andreasen 1998, 2000 for a more comprehensive account.)
Although the principles of cladistics classification were developed for defining
higher taxa, they can be adapted for defining race. A cladistic view of race
would require constructing a phylogenetic tree out of human breeding
populations; the nodes would represent breeding populations and the branches
would represent the births of new breeding populations. A ‘breeding
population’ is a set of local populations that exchange genetic material
through reproduction and are reasonably reproductively isolated from other
such sets. […] A breeding population is ‘born’ when a local subpopulation
becomes separated for its parent population and there is limited gene flow
between ‘‘parent’’ and ‘‘offspring’’. […] The terminal nodes represent current
breeding populations, the whole tree represents the human species, and the
nested hierarchy of monophyletic units represents a nested hierarchy of races.
(2000: S659)
More succinctly, the explicatum is defined as a kind of subpopulation of humans,
such that the subpopulation is represented by a monophyletic unit in an appropriate
cladistic classification of human breeding populations.
Now, by Referential Control, Andreasen can stipulate a theory of reference for
her explicatum. And, quite clearly, she stipulates a descriptivist theory of reference:
the extension of the explicatum contains whatever satisfies the above definition.
(This is clear, for example, on pp. S659–S661.)
By Explicandum Replacement, if this explication is a good explication, then one
should use the explicatum in place of the explicandum for the purpose of theorising
about human biology. So let us turn to Carnap’s criteria.
Criterion (I) demands similarity between explicandum and explicatum.
Andreasen argues that
there are at least two important elements of [the common-sense conception of
race] that the cladistic concept retains. First, many people believe that races
are subspecies; they are biologically objective categorical subdivisions of
Homo sapiens. Second, shared ancestry has played, and probably continues to
play, an important role in the ways that ordinary people think about race.
(2000: S665)
If Andreasen is right, then her explication satisfies (I).
Criterion (II) demands precision. And, as Andreasen’s definition is given in terms
of cladistics, it is plausibly as precise as other cladistically-defined taxa—perhaps
such as genus or, more controversially, species. So let us accept that the explicatum
satisfies (II).
Criterion (III) demands fruitfulness, construed in particular as usefulness for the
formulation of universal statements. And, given that the explicatum is defined in
terms of reproductively isolated histories, it is likely to feature in laws about, for
example, gene frequencies within and between various subpopulations, and the
relatedness between individuals belonging to the same or different subpopulations.
(See Andreasen 2000: S659–S660.) So, plausibly, the explicatum is fruitful.
The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference
123
Criterion (IV) demands simplicity. Now, it is unclear whether or not the
explicatum is simple but, as criterion (IV) is subordinate, I put it aside.
So let us accept that Andreasen’s explication is a good explication. Then, by
Explicandum Replacement, one should use the explicatum in place of the
explicandum for the purpose of theorising about human biology. And, as
Andreasen’s argument from reference is concerned (in part) with human biology,
her use of ‘‘race’’ in that argument should express the explicatum in place of the
explicandum. That is, she should take ‘‘race’’ to denote the kind of subpopulation
that satisfies her cladistic definition.
It follows a fortiori that, if Andreasen is using ‘‘race’’ as she ought, then she is
justified in assuming that ‘‘race’’ denotes the kind of subpopulation that satisfies her
cladistic definition. That is, she is justified in assuming a descriptivist theory of
reference for ‘‘race’’, where her definition provides the relevant reference-fixing
descriptions. So the assumption—that the relevant theory of reference is correct—is
justified.
So why do Machery et al. claim that Andreasen is assuming a causal-historical
theory of reference? To answer this question, it is useful to look more abstractly at
the picture I am defending. With respect to arguments from reference, both
Referential Control and Explicandum Replacement play important roles. First,
Referential Control allows one to stipulate a theory of reference for a new concept
(the explicatum). Second, Explicandum Replacement permits one to use a familiar
term to express the new concept. Together, this amounts to a justification for the
assumption that a theory of reference for a familiar term is correct. As I have
construed Andreasen’s argument from reference, it relies on the stipulation of a
descriptivist theory of reference for the new concept. However, Machery et al. focus
on the assumption that ‘‘race’’ denotes whatever falls under Andreasen’s cladistic
conception of race. Given that Andreasen takes the cladistic conception of race to
apply to biological kinds, combined with the fact that she mentions a Kripkean
causal-historical theory of reference for natural kind terms (2000: S662), Machery
et al. take this assumption to be an appeal to a causal-historical theory of reference.
However, on my view, that particular assumption corresponds to Explicandum
Replacement, which permits one to use a familiar term to express an explicatum.
The explicatum itself is assumed to be subject to a descriptivist theory of
reference—an assumption which is justified by Referential Control.
4.3 Churchland’s Argument
Let us now turn to Churchland’s argument: building on the claim that the common-
sense mental-state concepts are theoretical concepts of folk psychology, the
argument seeks to establish that, as the theoretical concepts may well be empty, it is
a serious possibility that there are no beliefs, desires, etc. The argument assumes
that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology are subject to a descriptivist theory
of reference, where the laws of folk psychology act as reference-fixing descriptions.
Now, in light of Machery et al.’s critique, Churchland is not entitled to simply
assume that the theoretical concepts of folk psychology are subject to a particular
theory of reference. However, as we have seen, theorists may stipulate particular
M. Pinder
123
theories of reference for their explicata. As such, it may be possible for Churchland
not to identify common-sense mental-state concepts with theoretical concepts of
folk psychology; rather, he might take himself to be explicating the former concepts
with something like the latter.
Let me spell out the explication. The explicanda are the common-sense mental-
state concepts of belief, desire, etc., that form the basis of our common-sense
ideas about human psychology. The explicata are a collection of theoretical
concepts, which we will take to be jointly introduced by the laws of folk
psychology such as (1)–(3) above. Given Referential Control, it can be stipulated
that these concepts are subject to a descriptivist theory of reference, with the laws
of folk psychology acting as reference-fixing descriptions. Thus, their extensions
contain whatever (if anything) comes sufficiently close to satisfying the laws of
folk psychology. For ease of reference, I call these concepts the descriptive
theoretical concepts.
Given Explicandum Replacement, if this explication is a good explication, then
one should use the explicata in place of the explicanda for the purpose of theorising
about human psychology. Let us see if this is a good explication.
Criterion (I) demands similarity between explicanda and explicata. Here is one
key similarity in the present case. A distinctive feature of the explicanda—the
common-sense mental-state concepts—is that they are deployed in a particular style
of explanation and prediction of behaviour. (For example: she ued because she
believes that p; she desires that q so she’ll probably w; etc.) And, the explicata
underpin structurally comparable explanations and predictions: the reference-fixing
descriptions for the descriptive theoretical concepts are the laws of folk psychology,
and those laws yield the relevant explanations and predictions of behaviour. So, in
this key sense, our explicata are similar to the explicanda.
Criterion (II) demands precision. The descriptive theoretical concepts are fully
specified by the laws of folk psychology. As such, full rules for their deployment are
explicitly given and so, in the relevant sense, they are precise.
Criterion (III) demands fruitfulness, construed in particular as usefulness for the
formulation of universal statements. In this sense, the descriptive theoretical
concepts are plausibly fruitful. Recall that, for Churchland, folk psychology is
construed as a set of laws. Now, on the most theoretically neutral interpretation of
those laws—that is, the interpretation on which one assumes nothing more about
beliefs, desires, etc., than is overtly encoded by those laws—the descriptive
theoretical concepts just are the concepts that feature in the laws of folk psychology.
So, it seems, the descriptive theoretical concepts are, in the present sense, fruitful.
There may seem to be a slight tension here. On the one hand, Churchland holds
that it is a serious possibility that the laws of folk psychology are radically false; but,
on the other hand, I suggest that the descriptive theoretical concepts are fruitful as
they feature in the laws of folk psychology. The tension arises as it is unclear that
concepts can be fruitful in virtue of featuring in laws that might well be radically
false. However, concepts are often taken to be fruitful in virtue of featuring in laws
that might well be radically false. For example, we might think that the technical
concepts of string in theoretical physics, Mendelian gene in biology and reference
in semantics are all fruitful concepts, despite the fact that they belong to theoretical
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frameworks that might well turn out to be radically false: we have no empirical
evidence in support of the existence of strings, it is unclear that there are anything
like Mendelian genes, and many have argued that semantics should do without
reference. Regardless, for Churchland, the resulting picture would be twofold: first,
the descriptive theoretical concepts would be deemed fruitful enough for us to think
that they are the appropriate explicata for our common-sense mental-state concept;
second, the descriptive theoretical concepts would be deemed insufficiently fruitful
in light of contemporary scientific standards for us to accept that they successfully
reflect psychological reality. This is a fine line, but one that is available to
Churchland.
Criterion (IV) demands simplicity. Now, it is plausible that the concepts are
moderately complex, as they are introduced implicitly by a network of laws rather
than simple definitions. However, as criterion (IV) is subordinate to criteria (I)–(III),
I again put this aside.
So let us accept that the explication in question is a good explication. Then, given
Explicandum Replacement, one should use the explicata in place of the explicanda
for the purpose of theorising about human psychology. That is, when theorising
about human psychology, one should take the terms of the familiar mentalistic
vocabulary—‘‘belief’’, ‘‘desire’’, etc.—to express the corresponding descriptive
theoretical concepts.
Return to Churchland’s argument from reference. I suggested above that
Churchland should not identify the common-sense mental-state concepts with the
theoretical concepts of folk psychology. Rather, he might explicate the common-
sense mental-state concepts with the descriptive theoretical concepts. Importantly, it
follows that the implicit assumption—that the relevant theory of reference for the
descriptive theoretical concepts is correct—is justified: by Referential Control,
Churchland is permitted to stipulate that the extensions of those concepts are fixed
descriptively by the laws of folk psychology. As such, if it really is a serious
possibility that folk psychology is false, it follows that it is a serious possibility that
the extensions of those concepts are empty. Moreover, by Explicandum Replace-
ment (and given the fact that the argument concerns human psychology),
Churchland ought to use the terms of the familiar mentalistic vocabulary to express
the descriptive theoretical concepts. So, if he uses the familiar mentalistic
vocabulary at all, he ought to express the conclusion of the argument along the
following lines:
It is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs, desires, etc.
The conclusion of Churchland’s argument, then, is retained.
One might object to this version of Churchland’s argument from reference. In
particular, one might object that Churchland would not be permitted to conclude
that there are no beliefs, desires, etc., on the basis of just one explication: there
might be an alternative explication of the common-sense mental-state concepts
whose explicata are non-empty. Given such an explication, Churchland should
presumably draw the conclusion that there are beliefs, desires, etc.
There are a couple of points to make about this. First, it does not suffice as an
objection simply to note that there might be an alternative explication of the
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common-sense mental-state concepts. The objector would have to argue that there
are alternative, non-empty explicata for the common-sense mental-state concepts,
which better satisfy (I)–(IV) than the descriptive theoretical concepts.
Second, Churchland is unlikely to accept that there are such alternative explicata.
Churchland (1981: 72–76) offers a number of considerations in favour of the
conclusion that nothing comes close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology. And,
if that conclusion is right, then any non-empty explicata will either fail to satisfy
criterion (I), which demands similarity to explicanda, or criterion (III), which
demands fruitfulness. Suppose, first, that the non-empty explicata feature in
generalisations that underpin explanations of human behaviour. Then, for Church-
land, those explanations must be quite unlike the everyday explanations in which
the common-sense mental-state concepts feature—otherwise we would expect the
common-sense mental-state concepts to likewise be non-empty. As such, for
Churchland, the non-empty explicata would in this key sense be dissimilar to our
common-sense mental-state concepts and would thus fail to satisfy (I). But if the
non-empty explicata did not feature in any generalisations that underpin explana-
tions of human behaviour, then they would not be fruitful in Carnap’s sense; they
would not satisfy criterion (III). Either way, from Churchland’s perspective, it is
unlikely that there are non-empty explicata for the common-sense mental-state
concepts that better satisfy (I)–(IV) than the descriptive theoretical concepts.
So Churchland can argue that, given the explication defence of arguments from
reference, his conclusion (that it is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs,
desires, etc.) stands.
4.4 Loose Ends
That is the explication defence of arguments from reference. Recall that, to respond
to Machery et al.’s critique, the proponent of an argument from reference must
provide a justification for her assumption that a particular theory of reference is
correct. I have argued that, in principle and in at least two principal cases, this
justification can be provided by appeal to explication. This is possible due to two
key features of explication. First, given Referential Control, one can stipulate a
theory of reference for an explicatum. Second, given Explicandum Replacement,
one ought for theoretical purposes to use the explicatum in place of the
explicandum, by using the relevant familiar term to express the explicatum rather
than the explicandum. Post-explication, these features justify the assumption that
the relevant familiar term is subject to the stipulated theory of reference. And, thus,
the proponent of an argument from reference can use explication to justify her
assumption that a particular theory of reference is correct.
There are some loose ends to tie up. First, I have focused on two examples that
involved the assumption of a descriptivist theory of reference. This similarity is
incidental: the examples were chosen because, first, I take Andreasen’s argument to
be particularly well suited to the explication defence and, second, the eliminativists’
argument from reference is the example that Machery et al. spell out in most depth
(Mallon et al. 2009: 334–336). For completeness, let me briefly consider another of
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their examples, which involves the assumption of a causal–historical theory of
reference.
Boyd (1988) argues that ‘‘developments in realist philosophy of science, together
with related ‘naturalistic’ developments in epistemology and philosophy of
language, can be employed in the articulation and defense of moral realism’’ (p.
308). For example, Boyd argues that, if a causal-historical theory of reference can
‘‘be extended to the analysis of moral language’’ (p. 325), then, in close analogy to
scientific knowledge, one can give a plausible account of moral knowledge as a
posteriori. Boyd goes on to sketch an account of the moral good as a homeostatic
cluster of properties that satisfy important human needs (pp. 329–331), and explains
why we might think that the cluster stands as the relevant causal-historical source of
uses of ‘‘good’’ (pp. 336–338). As Mallon et al. write, ‘‘a significant epistemological
position in ethics is [thus] derived from a specific theory about the reference of […]
moral terms’’ (2009: 337).
To apply the explication defence, one might amend Boyd’s position along the
following lines: rather than assuming that the causal-historical theory of reference
can be used to analyse moral language, one might offer an explication of moral
language such that the explicata are subject to the causal-historical theory of
reference. For example, one might suggest an explicatum for the common-sense
concept good such that the explicatum denotes whatever stands as the relevant
causal-historical source of ordinary uses of the common-sense concept. Boyd’s
position and arguments are naturally reworked to support the claim that such an
explicatum is: (I) similar in relevant respects to the explicandum, as it is ‘‘plausible
that the homeostatic cluster of fundamental human goods has, to a significant extent,
regulated the [actual] use of the term ‘good’’’ (p. 336); (II) precise, at least insofar
as the invocation of the causal-historical theory of reference serves to fix an
extension for the explicatum; and (III) fruitful, as the invocation of the causal-
historical theory will ensure that the explicatum denotes a property that is natural in
the same sense as ‘‘healthy’’ and ‘‘species’’ denote properties that are natural (pp.
322–325, 329–331). (I put aside the question of simplicity here.)
Given such an explication, Explicandum Replacement would imply that the
explicatum should be used in place of the explicandum in relevant theoretical
contexts, presumably including those in which one is doing metaethics. This
justifies the assumption of a causal-historical theory of reference for ‘‘good’’,
allowing one to subsequently draw Boyd’s conclusion that there is a plausible
account of moral knowledge as a posteriori. Thus, the explication defence of
arguments from reference can be applied to arguments from reference that involve
the assumption of a causal-historical theory of reference.
The second loose end: one might wonder whether my appeal to the method of
explication is really required to respond to Machery et al.’s critique. I have appealed
to that method in part to justify the stipulation of a theory of reference for ‘‘race’’,
‘‘belief’’, ‘‘desire’’, and so on. However, one might be tempted to suggest that a
theory of reference could be stipulated for such terms without any such appeal.21
For example: perhaps it would have been viable for Churchland to simply stipulate
21 An anonymous reviewer for this journal makes a suggestion along these lines.
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that he would use ‘‘belief’’, ‘‘desire’’, etc., as subject to a descriptivist theory of
reference (with the laws of folk psychology acting as reference-fixing descriptions),
and then argue that, in that sense, it is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs,
desires, etc. Certainly, there seems to be no problem in performing such a
stipulation; Churchland could have declared ‘‘Let ‘belief’, ‘desire’, etc., denote
whatever (if anything) comes sufficiently close to satisfying the laws of folk
psychology’’, and gone on from there.
The underlying difficulty facing this suggestion is that stipulations per se have no
normative force: they do not vindicate any analogue of Explicandum Replacement.
Thus, while I might be able to stipulate that I will use ‘‘belief’’ in any number of
ways, it does not follow that I or anybody else ought to use ‘‘belief’’ in that way. For
example, suppose that Churchland had stipulated a descriptivist theory of reference
for ‘‘belief’’, ‘‘desire’’, etc., as suggested in the above paragraph, before expressing
his conclusion by writing ‘‘it is a serious possibility that there are no beliefs, desires,
etc.’’ Then it would be reasonable to charge Churchland with obfuscating the issue;
one might criticise Churchland for arguing merely that it is a serious possibility that
nothing comes close to satisfying the laws of folk psychology, but misleadingly
representing that conclusion, in an ad hoc fashion, as if it concerned beliefs, desires,
etc. Such a charge is inappropriate, however, if the theory of reference is stipulated
as part of an explication, as I have suggested. Explications seek to refine our
concepts so that we ought to use appropriate explicata in place of explicanda when
discussing relevant subject matter—as captured by Explicandum Replacement.
Thus, when one deploys the explication defence of arguments from reference, one
seeks to provide explicata that ought to be used in place of the explicanda; this
justifies one’s use of terminology, and gives other theorists reason to use it
accordingly.
The third loose end: the kinds of objection that I raised in Sect. 3 do not gain
traction with respect to the explication defence. First, as explications are stipulative,
they are not subject to confirmation by appeal to experimental data concerning (folk
or expert) semantic intuitions. Second, explications provide a positive justification
for the assumption of a particular theory of reference. And, third, the factors that
justify the assumption of a theory of reference are plausibly relevant to the
conclusion of the argument from reference. For example, the question of which
concepts are appropriate to deploy when theorising about human biology is
plausibly very relevant to the substantive biological issue of whether race is
biologically real. Likewise, the question of which concepts are appropriate to deploy
when theorising about human psychology is plausibly very relevant to the
substantive psychological issue of whether there are beliefs, desires, etc. Substantive
issues about a given subject matter are not independent of how we should explicate
the common-sense concepts that pertain to that subject matter.
Finally, I note that the explication defence may not work for every argument
from reference. Consider an argument from reference that assumes a theory of
reference, R, for a term that is typically used to express the common-sense concept
c. The explication defence can be used just in case there is a good explication of c,
such that it is stipulated that R applies to the explicatum. For only then is one
justified in assuming that R is true of c. Whether there is a good explication will
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depend on the specifics of the case, so I will not say anything general about the issue
here. Regardless, as things stand, the explication defence can be used to respond to
Machery et al.’s critique for at least two of their principal targets (and perhaps a
third)—and I see no reason for thinking that it cannot be used in defence of other
arguments from reference.
5 Concluding Remark
Machery et al.’s critique of arguments from reference is unsuccessful. Arguments
from reference seek to establish substantive conclusions. And, as such, the concepts
deployed in such arguments should be appropriate for theoretical inquiry. To this
end, however, our common-sense concepts are often sub-optimal. To overcome the
limitations of common-sense, theorists engineer new concepts that are better suited
to the task. The semantics of these new concepts is not subject to empirical
confirmation or disconfirmation through ordinary linguistic inquiry; we do not
examine the intuitions of competent speakers to establish the extension of such
concepts. Rather, theorists stipulate a theory of reference for the new concepts. And
thus, when theorists deploy those concepts for theoretical purposes, it is legitimate
for them to assume that the theory of reference is correct. Given a good explication
of the relevant concepts, the assumption in an argument from reference that a theory
of reference is correct is justified.
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